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Law and Technology: Interactions and 
Relationships 
Daniel J. Gifford∗ 
The relations between law and technology are both simple 
and exceedingly complex.  At the most elementary level, 
technology consists in the application of labor to create a 
product, to generate a service or otherwise to produce a desired 
result. Technology develops as ways are found to produce new 
results or to produce old results using fewer or less costly 
inputs.  Law is generally understood to exist as a set of rules 
adopted by a society’s governing institutions that are applicable 
to all of its inhabitants.1 All modern societies have established 
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 1. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 89-96 (1961). Hart divides 
rules into “primary rules of obligation” and secondary rules.  Primary rules are 
those that govern behavior and facilitate contracting and other fulfilling 
activities. Secondary rules are concerned with interpreting, applying, and 
enforcing primary rules.  
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When property is transferable, then the incentives to be 
productive increase exponentially.  When a farmer possesses 
the right to keep the crops that he raises, he has an incentive to 
raise crops to feed himself and his family.  When he is able to 
trade his crops for goods or services provided by others, he 
acquires an incentive to produce more than for his own needs.  
Transferability means that I have an incentive not only to 
create goods and services for myself.  It means that I have an 
incentive to create goods and services for others as well, since I 
will be able to transfer the benefit of my productive activity to 
others, and they will be able to compensate me by transferring 
some of their property to me in payment.  As discussed below, 
transferability provides the basis for specialization and scale 
institutions charged with making determinations about the 
applicability and interpretations of these rules.  They have also 
established institutions that enforce the rules.  Law and 
technology interact when legal rules foster or retard the 
development of technology.  They also interact when society 
decides that technology produces undesirable results and 
employs legal rules to contain or modify those results. 
I. BACKGROUND 
It is generally understood that property rights are 
essential to generating incentives to productive behavior.  
Because traditional property does not include intellectual 
creations—such as the design of new technology—society has 
expanded that regime to include limited forms of protection for 
intellectually creative acts.  Let’s briefly review this 
background. 
A.  THE LAW, PROPERTY RIGHTS, INCENTIVES, AND TRADE 
In defining property rights, the law creates the conditions 
that are crucial for the development of technology.  Without 
property rights, the world would be a vast commons in which 
productive incentives would be absent.  Few would labor to 
create wealth if others were free to take it.  Property rights 
enable people to keep the wealth that they create.  Property 
rights, for example, enable the farmer to keep the crops that he 
raises.  These rights provide him with the incentive to farm.  
Almost all societies have recognized such basic property rights 
as the right of a farmer to his crops.  But a new and crucial 
dimension is added to property rights when property becomes 
transferable. 
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economies, and it also underlies the principle of comparative 
advantage in international trade. 
B. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ITS INCENTIVES 
Although property rights are essential to productive 
incentives, traditional property rights fail to generate 
incentives for creative activities.  If I devise a new product or a 
new, more efficient way to employ inputs to produce wealth, my 
creativity can be replicated at will in a society that recognizes 
rights only in traditional property.  Modern societies, therefore, 
create rights in intellectual creations in order to provide 
incentives to create as yet unknown technologies or 
improvements in existing technology. A person who creates a 
new technology qualifying for patent protection, for example, 
acquires exclusive rights in his invention for a twenty year 
period.2  The laws creating these rights are generally referred 
to as intellectual property laws.  A common way of viewing 
these laws is to see them as remedying a market failure by 
filling a pre-existing gap in property protection.3  Just as 
tangible property rights transform what would otherwise be an 
incentive-free commons into a regime that provides productive 
incentives, intellectual property laws transform parts of a 
preexisting intellectual commons into a regime that provides 
incentives for creativity.  The intellectual property laws that 
are most important to the development of technology are the 
patent and copyright laws.  Their importance has been 
recognized throughout the history of the Republic.  Indeed, the 
U.S. Constitution specifically authorizes Congress to enact both 
sets of laws in order “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts.”4  This phrasing reflects the understanding of the 
Framers that creative activities could be stimulated through 
the economic incentives that the patent and copyright laws 
provide. 
II. COMPETITION, MONOPOLY, TECHNOLOGY AND THE 
GENERATION OF WEALTH 
We know that free and open markets maximize productive 
incentives and that competition among sellers maximizes 
 2. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000). 
 3. See, e.g., Daniel J. Gifford, Innovation and Creativity in the Fine Arts: 
The Relevance and Irrelevance of Copyright, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 
569, 572-73 (2000). 
 4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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societal wealth.5  So long as markets operate competitively, 
goods and services are routed to their highest valued uses.  A 
competitive economic system also fosters productive efficiency 
in the short run by pressuring producers to employ their most 
cost-effective techniques and in the long run by replacing the 
less efficient producers with more efficient producers.  Thus, at 
all times, competition pressures producers to employ the most 
efficient technologies available to them. 
Although competitive markets force producers to act 
efficiently, the tendencies of monopolies are otherwise.  
Monopolies tend to restrict production in order to maintain 
prices at higher-than-competitive levels.  In so doing, they deny 
society those uses of their products whose values are less than 
the monopoly price but higher than their cost of production.  
This output restriction is inconsistent with the allocation of 
society’s assets to their highest valued uses and constitutes a 
social waste that economists often refer to as a “deadweight 
social loss.”6  In this respect, monopolies produce allocative 
inefficiencies.  Monopolies, moreover, are also less keyed to 
productive efficiency, as the incentives to implement new 
technologies are reduced in monopolistic market structures. 
While competitive markets are forced by competition to adopt 
the most efficient technologies as they emerge, monopolies lack 
that competitive pressure.  A monopolist, of course, has an 
incentive to invest in efficient technology, as that technology 
will reduce its costs and thereby increase its profits.  But 
because the incentive structure is reduced, the implementation 
of new technology may be delayed.7 
Society’s embrace of competitive markets as a means of 
maximizing aggregate wealth exists in a dynamic tension with 
the use of the exclusive rights over technological developments 
provided by the intellectual property laws.  Because there may 
 5. See Daniel J. Gifford, Government Policy Towards Innovation in the 
United States, Canada, and the European Union as Manifested in Patent, 
Copyright, and Competition Laws, 57 SMU L. REV. 1339, 1340 (2004). 
 6. See, e.g., ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, 
MICROECONOMICS 348 (5th ed. 2001). The deadweight social loss is the net 
value of the output that would be produced in a competitive market, but which 
is not produced by a monopoly. It is the difference between (1) potential 
buyers’ reservation prices that are less than the monopoly price and (2) 
marginal cost. 
 7. See Kenneth Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources 
for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY (R.R. 
Nelson ed., 1969). 
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be no effective substitutes for some such developments, the 
exclusive rights provided under the patent law may amount to 
an economic monopoly.  In exercising its monopoly power under 
the patent, the patentee may, like other monopolists, license 
the technology at rates that are sufficiently high as to exclude 
many uses.  As a result, society is denied uses of a valuable 
technology, societal assets are misallocated, and deadweight 
social loss results.8 
The tension between intellectual property rights and 
competition is reflected in the uneasy relationship that has 
existed, and continues to exist, between the antitrust laws and 
the intellectual property laws, especially within patent and 
copyright law.  In one view, perceived conflict between the 
policies of the Sherman Act and patent and copyright laws 
lacks substance.  The competition laws are designed to foster 
economic welfare and so are the intellectual property laws.  The 
latter employ exclusive rights as a means for generating new 
technology; and new technology raises societal welfare.  The 
restraints imposed by intellectual property rights holders are in 
newly created markets that would not have existed had these 
restraints been barred ex ante.  In this view, the intellectual 
property laws do not create restraints that would not exist in 
their absence.  Finally, technology probably is largely 
responsible for much of our economic welfare, and the 
intellectual property laws are designed to foster the 
development of new technology.9 
There are, however, more sophisticated ways of 
understanding the relation between the competition laws and 
the intellectual property laws.  It is true that intellectual 
property laws help to provide the incentives that stimulate the 
technological innovation that enriches society.  But that 
analysis is overly simple.  Intellectual property laws generate 
both benefits and costs.  Their major costs lie in the very 
exclusivity that they provide rights holders.  Those laws not 
only generate new technology, they also restrict its use.  This 
restriction—however justified as necessary to generate 
 8. See Daniel J. Gifford, How Do the Social Benefits and Costs of the 
Patent System Stack Up in Pharmaceuticals?, 12  J. INTELL. PROP. L. 75, 82 
(2004). 
 9. See, e.g., Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: 
Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1020, 1026 (1987) (“[S]tudies have shown that over the forty-year period from 
the late 1920s to the late 1960s, at least half of the gain in United States 
output was due solely to technological and scientific progress.”) 
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incentives—is nonetheless a social waste.  Ideally, a society 
should limit intellectual property rights to a term in which the 
marginal social costs of the restraints that they facilitate are 
less than the marginal social benefits that they provide.  Louis 
Kaplow developed such an analysis over twenty years ago.10 
Observing that the longer the patent term, the greater the 
incentive to invent, Kaplow assumed that lengthening the 
patent term would generate additional inventions.  But he also 
pointed out that an increase in the patent term would extend 
the patent-based restraints on all existing patents—patents on 
inventions for which the existing term of protection was 
adequate.  Extending the term would both generate marginal 
social benefits (i.e., new inventions) and marginal social costs 
(i.e., adding an additional year of restrictions on all other 
inventions).  Although Kaplow’s analysis is ingenious, it cannot 
be easily applied because no one knows how to quantify either 
the marginal benefits or the marginal costs of inventions.  His 
analysis does, however, provide a conceptual insight into the 
policy issues latent in tensions between competition laws and 
intellectual property laws.  Moreover, Kaplow’s analysis 
provides a framework for policy judgments.  Under simplified 
but reasonable assumptions, the existing patent term may well 
produce positive welfare results at the margins.11 
III. THE SCOPE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
PROTECTION 
 The law defines not only the term of intellectual property 
rights but also their scope. In defining their scope, the law 
again enters an area of tension.  For decades, the competition 
laws and the intellectual property laws have wrestled with 
issues of tying and bundling, which are issues that concern the 
scope of intellectual-property protection.  Does my intellectual 
property right authorize me to insist that purchasers, lessees or 
licensees use other products along with the protected one?  In 
the early twentieth century, the courts appeared willing to 
permit a patentee to control the products that could be used 
with a patented one.12  Later, the courts developed a doctrine of 
 10. See Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 
97 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1825-26 (1984). 
 11. See Gifford, supra note 8, at 106. 
 12. See, e.g., Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 47-49 (1912); Heaton-
Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 F. 288, 300-01 
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patent misuse as part of patent law.13  During the first half of 
the last century, the courts treated the tying of a separate 
product to a patented one as misuse.14  During the period of 
misuse, the courts would not enforce the patent.  The misuse 
cases eventually affected the antitrust laws.15  In the 1960s, 
the act of tying a product to a patent or copyright became a per 
se antitrust violation.
The tensions between these two sets of laws, however, were 
a source of continuing readjustment.  In the 1952 patent act 
revision, Congress drew limits on the judicially-developed 
doctrine of patent misuse.17  Henceforth, misuse would be 
limited to the tying involving so-called staple articles of 
commerce.  Products designed specially for use with a patented 
product could be tied with impunity to a patented product.18  
Congress strengthened its restrictions on the misuse doctrine 
in 1988.19  Even as Congress was narrowing the doctrine of 
patent misuse at mid-century, the courts were expanding the 
application of the antitrust laws to tying arrangements 
involving patents.  From the late 1940s well into the 1970s, the 
courts presumed that a patent created market power, and from 
that presumption created a virtually per se rule against tying 
arrangements involving patents.20  Although in the 1970s the 
courts began retreating from their earlier view that tying 
arrangements were always socially harmful,21 it was not until 
2006 that the Supreme Court explicitly ruled that a patent 
(6th Cir. 1896). 
 13. See Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 665-68 
(1944); Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680, 
680 (1944); Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 489 (1942); 
Carbice Corp. of Am. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 33-34 (1931). The 
origins of the misuse doctrine are traceable to Motion Picture Patents Co. v. 
Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). 
 14. See cases cited supra note 13. 
 15. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. at 684 (“[T]he effort 
made here to control competition in this unpatented device plainly violates the 
anti-trust laws”). 
 16. United States v. Loew’s Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 44-45 (1962). 
 17. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000). 
 18. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000). 
 19. See Pub. L. 100-703, § 201, 102 Stat. 4676 (codified as amended at 35 
U.S.C. § 271 (2000)). 
 20. See Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 608 
(1953); Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 398-402 (1947); Mercoid 
Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944).  See also Daniel J. 
Gifford, The Antitrust/Intellectual Property Interface: An Emerging Solution to 
an Intractable Problem, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 363, 380-81 (2002). 
 21. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 429 U.S. 610 (1977). 
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would not be presumed to generate market power for purposes 
of applying the antitrust laws to tying arrangements.22 
Other issues of patent scope have plagued patent law for 
decades.  Patent law is designed to extend protection only to 
inventions that are advances beyond the capability of ordinary 
practitioners in the field.23  And the law protects only what the 
inventor claims.  Yet within these simple rules, troublesome 
issues constantly emerge.  The judicially-developed doctrine of 
equivalents is designed to extend protection to matter not 
covered in the claims but which are insubstantial variations of 
the claimed invention.24 Thus at mid-century the Court 
extended the scope of a patented welding flux from the 
combination set forth in the claims (a composition of calcium 
fluoride with an alkaline earth-metal silicate) to a different 
combination with the same properties (a combination of 
calcium fluoride with manganese (a non-earth metal silicate).25  
In recent years, the courts have sharply curtailed the 
availability of the doctrine of equivalents.  Amendments to a 
patent application are likely to estop a patentee from later 
relying upon the doctrine of equivalents, especially when the 
patentee attempts to use that doctrine against variations that 
were foreseeable at the time of the amendment.26  In the bio-
tech area, the patent law’s written description requirement27 
limits the doctrine of equivalents in ways that make its 
ramifications socially problematic.  Thus in a leading case, the 
Federal Circuit ruled that the University of California at 
Berkeley, which had isolated the DNA coding for rat insulin, 
could not assert claims to human insulin, even though human 
and rat insulin are very similar.28  Despite this similarity, the 
university’s claim for human insulin failed because it had 
 22. Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 126 S.Ct. 1281, 1293 
(2006). 
 23. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000). 
 24. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 
722, 731 (2002) (referring to the doctrine of equivalents extending to 
“[u]nimportant and insubstantial substitutes for certain elements” of the 
patent claims). 
 25. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods., Inc., 339 U.S. 605, 611-12 
(1950). 
 26. Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 736-40; Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc., v. Hilton 
Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40-41 (1997). 
 27. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). 
 28. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1559 
(Fed. Cir. 1997). 
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described only the DNA sequence for rat insulin.  That 
description, however, may well have been sufficient to enable 
others to produce human insulin (by employing the identified 
sequence to construct a gene probe that would identify the 
human variant).29 
The doctrinal issues discussed above are part of a larger 
policy conundrum involving questions of how the law should be 
structured to generate optimum incentives for inventive 
activity.  Is the description requirement being applied in such a 
stringent manner as to destroy the incentive to invent?  A 
patent on rat insulin loses its commercial value if others can 
employ that patent as a tool to produce human insulin.  The 
current stringency with which the doctrine of equivalents is 
interpreted may effectively destroy the commercial benefits of 
many inventions and thus undermine the very incentives that 
the law is designed to foster.  Professors Dan Burk and Mark 
Lemley have argued that both the scope of patent protection 
and the height of the bar posed by the requirement of non-
obviousness should vary by field of invention.30  In the bio-tech 
arena, for example, patents should be difficult to acquire, but, 
once acquired, should provide extensive protection over a wide 
area, which is a result that is at odds with the current case law. 
The Lemley and Burk approach would help mitigate the 
problem of the anti-commons that some have suggested may be 
adversely affecting research and innovation in bio-technology.31  
The argument is that multiple patents on minor inventions are 
crowding the available research space, so that potential 
inventors are discouraged by the need to obtain multiple 
licenses, thus raising the costs of inventive activity.  Raising 
the standard of non-obviousness in the bio-tech area as they 
suggest would generate fewer patents, thus freeing up research 
 29. The Eli Lilly court itself acknowledged that the specification may have 
provided an enabling disclosure. See Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1567. See also 
Carrie A. Morgan, After the Fire and Rain, Lilly Still Stands, 31 DAYTON L. 
REV. 127, 139 (2005); Michael Delmas Plimier, Genentech, Inc. v. Novo 
Nordisk & University of California v. Eli Lilly and Co., 13 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 149, 160 (1998). 
 30. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 
VA. L. REV. 1575, 1680-83 (2003). 
 31. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter 
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698, 698-701 
(1998). See also Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property 
in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 624-25 (1998).  
But see David E. Adelman, A Fallacy of the Commons in Biotech Patent 
Policy, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 985 (2005). 
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space for the development of more valuable inventions. 
IV. NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES 
The negative aspects of the law and technology 
relationship are illustrated in a leading New York case that 
applied (and modified) classic nuisance doctrine against a 
cement plant whose emissions of dust and raw materials were 
damaging nearby landowners.32  Although the court ostensibly 
refused to make use of private litigation as a means of 
furthering the public interest in cleaner air by closing the 
offending plant, the court nonetheless recognized that cost 
externalities underlay the lawsuit. In its ruling, the court 
ordered the defendant to compensate the plaintiffs, thus forcing 
the defendant to internalize the pollution costs that theretofore 
had been borne by the plaintiffs.  The problem in this case—as 
in almost all pollution cases—is that the adverse effects of a 
business firm’s discharges into the air or water do not appear 
on the firm’s books as a cost of its operations nor does the firm 
bear those costs in any other way.33  Accordingly, costs that are 
properly attributable to the firm’s operations are borne by 
others or by society at large.  Federal and state anti-pollution 
legislation is thus directed towards forcing business firms to 
internalize these costs.  Firms internalize these costs when 
they compensate affected people (as in the New York case cited 
above) or when they take action to reduce the levels of the 
emissions from their plants.  When all such firms take such 
action, they pass on those costs to their customers, who bear 
the final costs of producing the products that they desire.34 
The task of forcing polluting business firms to internalize 
 32. See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 219-20 (1970). The 
application of traditional nuisance doctrine would have required the court to 
abate the nuisance by shutting down the defendant’s plant.  Because the value 
of the defendant’s operations greatly exceeded the harm imposed on the 
plaintiffs, the court instead ordered the defendant to compensate the plaintiffs 
for their harm.  The court thus forced the defendant to internalize as costs 
that part of its operations that were imposing harm upon the plaintiffs. See 
discussion of this case in Alexandra B. Klass, Common Law and Federalism in 
the Age of the Regulatory State, 92 IOWA L. REV. 545, 571-72 (2007). 
 33. See discussion of externalities in PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 6, 
at 621. 
 34. See, e.g., Thomas Lundmark, Systemizing Environmental Law on a 
German Model, 7 DICK. J. ENVTL. L & POL’Y, 1, 18 (1998) (discussing 
internalization of social costs of pollution and their transmission to 
customers). 
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their costs was initially carried out through traditional 
prescriptive regulation.35  In recent years, however, legislators 
and policy-makers have concluded that the traditional 
command-and-control approach to pollution reduction is often 
not the most effective one.  As a result, an array of programs 
involving incentives, pollution caps, trading permits, and 
stakeholder negotiations have emerged.36  Experience appears 
to show that the basic idea behind these less coercive 
approaches is a sound one, but that the programs need to be 
carefully designed and supervised to prevent abuses.37 
V. POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES 
To what extent can law be designed to engender enhanced 
economic growth by, for example, fostering synergistically-
employed technologies, the creation of compact skilled labor 
markets, or the development of advanced technology?  Both 
theory and experience suggest that laws and legal institutions 
can play significant, but limited, roles in technological 
development.  Law and legal institutions play a significant role 
in the development of new technology through the intellectual-
property laws, as noted above.38  The law and legal institutions 
play a major role in engendering basic research, for which 
market incentives are lacking.39  These legal and governmental 
interventions are general in nature and help to provide 
stimulus that the market cannot provide. 
Law can be effective in promoting economic objectives 
when it acts as an adjunct to the market.  The genius of the 
patent system is that it provides a legal structure keyed to the 
market.40  The law provides the exclusive rights that act (in 
 35. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management—Is it 
Possible? 7 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 21 (2005). 
 36. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering Stakeholders: Limits on 
Collaboration as the Basis for Flexible Regulation, 41 WM & MARY L. REV. 411, 
411-14 (2000); Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Emissions Allowance Trading Under the 
Clean Air Act: A Model for Future Environmental Regulations?, 7 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 352 (1999) (discussing permit trading and caps). 
 37. Christopher H. Schroeder, Prophets, Priests, and Pragmatists, 87 
MINN. L. REV. 1065, 1091 (2003) (discussing, inter alia, successes of cap-and-
trade program under the Clean Air Act and the failures of cap-and-trade 
under analogous California laws). 
 38. See supra text accompanying notes 2-4, 9-10. 
 39. Most basic research is funded by the federal government. See U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2001 508 
tbl. 769 (2001). 
 40. See Gifford, supra note 8, at 83-84. 
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conjunction with the market) as the stimulus to invention, but 
the market is the ultimate determinant of the rewards.  The 
system rewards only those who produce what the market 
demands.  Should government—through law and legal 
institutions—attempt intervention to foster the growth of 
particular industrial sectors or business firms, it is likely to 
fail.  An array of proposals for government intervention in 
particular sectors of the economy were made during the 1980s 
and early 1990s under the rubric of “industrial policy”.41  In 
these situations, the success of government and legal 
intervention would require legislators or officials to possess 
greater information than the market.  Because this is virtually 
impossible, government interventions on behalf of particular 
industries or companies are almost certain to decrease rather 
than increase overall economic well-being.  In addition to the 
government’s relative lack of knowledge, its attempts at 
intervention in the economy would be subject to distortion by 
interest groups seeking assistance, often from the very 
industries that were in decline and whose future was in 
doubt.42  Yet it would be those industries—because of their 
close community ties and sometimes large work forces—that 
would be able to exert substantial political pressure on their 
behalf.  For all of these reasons, government, law, and legal 
institutions appear incapable of generating positive 
externalities in particular sectors of the economy. 
 41. See, e.g., CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE INDUSTRIAL POLICY 
DEBATE xiii-xxii (1983), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=5320&sequence=0; Industrial Policy 
Symposium, 5 STAN. L & POL’Y REV. 6 (1993).  One commentator described an 
array of such proposals in the early 1990’s as follows: 
[J]oint research and development with the federal government or 
with federal government support; permitting joint activities that 
otherwise would be prohibited by antitrust laws; and foreign 
marketing support. For example, subsidized financing, through the 
export import bank or other means, and reductions in the costs of 
operating a business through tax benefits. Things of this sort are all 
in the category of industrial policy that is being considered at the 
moment. 
Robert C. Cassidy, Jr., Trade Policy Aspects of Industrial Policy in the U.S., 19 
CAN-U.S. L.J. 55 (1993).  The governmental structures that would facilitate 
such industrial policies are described in Robert E. Scott, Sectorial Policies and 
Participant Commitments: The Keys to Effective Trade and Industrial Policies, 
5 STAN. L & POL’Y REV. 127 (1993). 
 42. See, e.g., Jim Chen & Daniel J. Gifford, Law as Industrial Policy: 
Economic Analysis of Law in a New Key, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 1315, 1346-47 
(1995). 
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 VI. INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND TECHNOLOGY 
A key spur to industrial development in the United States 
has been its large continent-wide market.  This large market 
has enabled manufacturers to employ technology incorporating 
scale economies.  Conversely, during the late nineteenth 
century and early twentieth century, Europe was divided into 
nation-sized markets by protectionist legislation.43  As a result, 
European manufacturers lacked access to a large market that 
was conducive to scale economies.  Although a tariff barrier 
also protected U.S. markets during this period, its 
manufacturers nonetheless had access to the large U.S. 
domestic market.  The negative effects of protection on 
industrial development that afflicted European manufacturers, 
accordingly, were muted in this country.44 
Since the adoption of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade45 after the conclusion of World War II, the nations of 
the world have been gradually reducing their tariffs, 
stimulating an ever increasing amount of international trade.  
This movement towards freer trade culminated in the creation 
of the World Trade Organization in 1994 and the associated 
TRIPS agreement.46  The lowering of tariffs and other barriers 
to trade subjects U.S. industries to competition from abroad 
(and subjects foreign producers to competition from U.S. 
producers), thus intensifying worldwide competition.  This new 
competition increases the pressures on all industry participants 
to develop and employ the most efficient technologies.  This 
intensifying global competition provides a comparative 
advantage to labor-intensive technologies in developing nations 
with relatively low wage rates.  As a result, U.S.-based 
producers in labor-intensive industries producing tradable 
goods are in the process of being replaced by producers from 
developing nations.  At the same time, the adoption of the 
TRIPS agreement means that the U.S. advantages in the 
production of creative products (such as in the software, 
 43. See Daniel J. Gifford, Trade and Tensions, 15 MINN. J. INT’L L. 297, 
298-99 (2006). 
 44. See. e.g., discussion in Daniel J. Gifford, Trade and Tensions, 15 
MINN. J. INT’L. L.  297, 299-300 (2006). 
 45. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187. 
 46. See AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS, Annex 1C, April 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 
1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement], available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf. 
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pharmaceuticals, and entertainment industries) will be 
strengthened, as intellectual property protection extends 
globally. 
The pressures of global competition thus are forcing a 
reallocation of the technologies employed in each nation in 
ways that reflect each nation’s comparative advantage.  
Although some temporary hardships will occur, the end result 
will produce an overall increase in the world’s wealth, 
benefiting all nations.  And because the new WTO-TRIPS 
regime widens protection of intellectual property, the 
incentives for innovation are increased. These increased 
incentives should generate additional innovation, which over 
time will produce increases in global welfare. 
VII. LEGAL FAILURES AND MARKET FAILURES 
The preceding discussion has referenced various places in 
which laws and market incentives interact to foster the 
development and employment of technology, generating 
increases in aggregate welfare.  Yet there remain gaps or 
failures in these law/market interactions.  Market failures are 
often the result of the failures of the legal system to adequately 
specify property rights.  Intellectual property laws, for example, 
are required to remedy inadequacies in the property rights 
regime that the legal system developed in simpler times.47  
Thus, market failures can often be understood as the result of 
legal failures.  In the twenty-first century, other failures of the 
law/market relationship are becoming widely appreciated.  
These newly appreciated failures differ from the law/market 
failures previously discussed because they are not identified by 
welfare analyses that use an index of maximizing aggregate 
economic welfare for measurement. 
The pharmaceutical industry provides an example of how 
law and technology interact both positively and negatively.  
The current intellectual property system generates incentives 
for pharmaceutical companies to develop new drugs for the 
relief of illnesses experienced by the populations of the 
developed nations.  As observed above, the companies are 
rewarded for their efforts from sales of successful products at 
supra-competitive prices.  It was noted above that a negative 
(albeit necessary) effect of this system is the short-term waste 
 47. See supra text accompanying notes 2-4. 
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that results when these higher prices exceed the reservation 
prices of potential customers.48  TRIPs requires that all 
members of the WTO begin to recognize and enforce 
intellectual property rights.49  Most of these rights involving 
pharmaceuticals belong to companies from the developed world.  
As a result, the negative effects of intellectual property rights 
involving pharmaceuticals are magnified.  The legal framework 
established by the WTO and TRIPs have only gradually began 
to adjust to these problems.50 
First, the short-term waste imposed by the denial of life-
saving drugs to millions in the under-developed world is 
immense, dwarfing the dead-weight loss in the developed 
nations.  In the under-developed nations, the lives of millions of 
people depend upon access to HIV-AIDS drugs.  If they cannot 
receive these drugs because the prices are keyed to the markets 
of the developed world, then the social loss is staggering.  
Moreover, in assessing this loss, traditional economic 
approaches are problematic: it will not do to set the value of a 
life on the basis of a person’s earnings converted into the 
currency of the developed world, as in euros or dollars.  Such an 
approach would obscure the human tragedy involved.  Second, 
the current international legal system appears to impede any 
effort by the pharmaceutical companies to reduce their prices 
in the poorer underdeveloped world.  Those companies might 
benefit themselves as well as millions of potential customers by 
offering their products at prices keyed to local market 
conditions.  The danger of potential arbitrageurs purchasing 
their products at these lower prices and reselling them in 
Europe and North America, however, discourages such a 
course.  This danger is reinforced by The General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Article XI,51 incorporated into the 
World Trade Organization Agreement.  GATT Article IX 
appears to prevent governments from interfering with 
arbitrage operations.52 
The provisions of GATT Article XI, however, should be 
 48. See supra text accompanying notes 10-11. 
 49. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 46, at 321. 
 50. See notes 54 and 55 supra and accompanying text. 
 51. See GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, Annex 1B, April 
15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994) [hereinafter GATT], 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/06-gatt.pdf. 
 52. See Daniel J. Gifford, How Do the Social Benefits and Costs of the 
Patent System Stack up in Pharmaceuticals?, 12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 75, 115-22 
(2004). 
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read in conjunction with Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement53 
that permits governments to subject patentees to a compulsory-
licensing regime in cases of national emergency or other 
circumstances of extreme urgency.  The Doha Declaration of 
200154 and the subsequent WTO General Council decision of 
200355 contemplate an extension of the literal terms of Article 
31 to authorize a government to impose compulsory licensing, 
allowing foreign producers to supply needed pharmaceuticals.  
But the Council decision took steps to ensure that the imported 
pharmaceuticals would not be subject to export by 
arbitrageurs.56  This approach towards a broad interpretation 
of Article 31 may well have implications for the interpretation 
of GATT Article XI in situations of health emergencies. 
Article 31 and its construction in the Doha Declaration and 
Council decision provide some relief for underdeveloped nations 
experiencing health emergencies.  The effects of the Doha 
Declaration and Council decision on the interpretation of GATT 
Article XI and the consequent ability of pharmaceutical 
companies to offer discount pricing in nations whose 
governments commit to preventing arbitrage is as yet unclear.  
Nevertheless, the foregoing matters are broadly suggestive of 
substantial deficiencies in the way law and pharmaceutical 
technologies interact in the development and deployment of 
new products.  The intellectual property regime of the 
developed world appears to generate products needed in that 
world.  But—apart from the limited exemptions available 
under TRIPS Article 31 and the Doha-generated glosses on its 
provisions—that regime denies the use of newly-developed 
pharmaceuticals to the underdeveloped world.  In addition, the 
present system skews research solely toward the needs of the 
developed world.  The western intellectual-property regime 
provides no incentives for the development of cures for sleeping 
sickness or other illnesses not found in western nations.  Nor 
does that regime provide incentives for the development of 
vaccines against tuberculosis, a scourge of underdeveloped 
nations. 
 53. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 46, at art. 31. 
 54. See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 20 
November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M 755 (2002). 
 55. See World Trade Organization, General Council, Implementation of 
Paragraph 6 of the DOHA Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health, WT/L/540 (Sept. 2, 2003), 43 I.L.M. 509 (2003). 
 56. Id. at ¶ 2(b). 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
This very brief review of some of the interplay between law 
and technology is sufficient to raise serious policy questions 
about how that interplay can be improved.  The current regime 
has conferred immense benefits on mankind.  Yet as the 
discussion has shown, it is in no way optimal.  Vast room for 
improvement exists, not only in industries such as the 
pharmaceuticals where the dysfunctions may be more 
apparent, but in other areas as well, where markets fail to 
reflect human needs.57 
 57. Markets thus fail to operate as a stimulus to economic development in 
substantial portions of the world where the legal and other preconditions for 
their effective operation are lacking. Without outside intervention, vast 
numbers of people will be condemned to dire poverty. In such circumstances, 
masses of people lack access to even the most elementary technologies. See 
JEFFREY D. SACHS, THE END OF POVERTY: ECONOMIC POSSIBILITIES FOR OUR 
TIME (2005). These circumstances call for a reevaluation of the interplays 
among law, markets and technologies, which is a reevaluation beyond the 
scope of this brief paper. 
